bootstrap-mediation analysis found that activation in the left insula mediated the relationship between the agreeableness domain and the revised SC (a), the relationship between the conscientiousness domain and the revised SC (b), and the relationship between the averaged score of agreeableness and conscientiousness and the revised SC Supplementary Table S2 . Three local maxima more than 8.0mm apart are reported.
Results of each domain in NEO-PI-R
The coordinates are in the MNI space. 
Pairs of destinations
London (¥100,000) Manchester (¥100,000)
San Francisco (¥100,000) Las Vegas (¥100,000)
Tahiti (¥50,000) Bali (¥50,000)
Macau (¥30,000) Hong Kong (¥30,000)
Shanghai (¥40,000) Beijing (¥40,000)
Berlin (¥100,000) Munich (¥100,000)
Seoul (¥30,000) Taipei (¥30,000)
Monaco (¥50,000) Sicily (¥50,000)
Florence (¥100,000) Venice (¥100,000)
Saipan (¥50,000) Guam (¥50,000)
Rome (¥100,000) Milan (¥100,000)
Moscow (¥100,000) Saint Petersburg (¥100,000)
Toronto (¥80,000) Montreal (¥80,000)
Sao Paulo (¥100,000) Rio (¥100,000) Sydney (¥80,000) Melbourne (¥80,000)
New York (¥80,000) Los Angeles (¥80,000)
Paris (¥100,000) Nice (¥100,000) Kamakura* (¥30,000) Hakone* (¥30,000) Izu* (¥40,000) Atami* (¥40,000) Otaru* (¥30,000) Hakodate* (¥30,000) Beppu* (¥40,000) Noboribetsu* (¥40,000) Yakushima* (¥40,000) Awami* (¥40,000) Niigata* (¥30,000) Hokkaido* (¥30,000)
Supplementary Table S8.
All 23 pairs of destinations in the fMRI task
The defined costs of the tickets in the control condition are provided in parentheses.
*Popular travel destinations in Japan

Supplementary Introduction
Prior research concerning the sunk cost effect
This section briefly describes previous empirical evidence regarding the sunk cost effect.
The first discussion of sunk cost effects came from organizational behavior scholars.
They demonstrated in hypothetical lab experiments that subjects were more likely to continue investing in a project if its previous (sunk) costs were high 1 . This type of decision came to be called a "progress" decision. An influential 1980 paper described sunk cost effects in a different type of "utilization" decision: Suppose you bought tickets for a basketball game and a snowstorm arose. Many people would go because they don't want to "waste" the tickets. But if they hadn't bought the tickets yet, or lost the ticket and had to replace it, they would not go or buy a new one 2 . (The utilization paradigm is used in our study.) Subsequent studies dissected the possible causes of the sunk cost effect in different experiments 3 . Most experiments find sunk cost effects, though effects are often small in magnitude and not completely robust to treatment changes 4 .
In establishing the sunk cost effect, it is extremely important to control for perceptions of any marginal costs (e.g. from investing further in progress decisions) and marginal benefits 5, 6 . For example, suppose a company builds a building and expects it to cost $10 million, and values it at $15 million. After finishing half of the building, spending $5 million, they realize it will cost $12 million more to complete it. Suppose the half-finished building is worthless unless it is finished. Then the company must decide whether to spend an additional $12 million to have a building worth $15 million.
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The company should continue to spend money because the marginal benefit minus the marginal cost is positive (=15-12=+3). When they are done, they will have paid $17 million for a building worth $15 million. But the mistake that was made was underestimating the chance of a cost overrun. Paying the marginal $12 million was not a sunk cost mistake. This age effect is especially important because 72% of the effects came from young college student subjects.
An interesting variable with mixed effects is the length of time between when a cost was first sunk, and when a later decision must be made 10 . Time passage reduces sunk costs effects for utilization decisions but increases it (more weakly) for progress decisions. One theory rationalizes the sunk cost effect as an optimal heuristic if estimated benefits are forgotten over time. If sunk costs are proxies for those forgotten benefits, then continuing projects based on their sunk costs could be rational 11 . However, the main prediction of this theory is that sunk cost effects should get stronger with longer time passage (presuming forgetting increases with time passage too), which is certainly not the case for utilization decisions.
Some of the most conclusive studies have come from field experiments. A pioneering study gave unexpected discounts to people buying tickets to a series of six plays 2 . The people who got discounts went to fewer of the first three plays (the difference then disappeared for the last three plays). A similar study offered unexpected discounts to diners at an all-you-can-eat pizza restaurant 12 . The diners who paid full price ate one more slice of pizza than those who paid less. In contrast, varying prices charged for a water purification product in Zambia did not show a sunk cost effect (in the form of higher usage by those who paid more) 13 .
Analyses of field data without experimental control have also been consistent with sunk cost effects. Consider NBA basketball players who are chosen higher up in the draft, because they are expected to play better (and are usually paid more). Controlling for actual performance, the higher-drafted players play more minutes even three seasons later 5, 14 . Driving a car in Singapore could create sunk cost effects because licenses to drive are extremely expensive 15 . Indeed, one particularly careful analysis showed that drivers who paid more for a license drove more (an effect which grew smaller over time as their license fees were mentally 'amortized'). In penny auctions, players pay a nonrefundable fee to top the bid of a previous "leader". If enough time passes after a topping bid the auction ends. The selling company collects the nonrefundable fees and sells the good at the last price. Analysis of bids indicates that players who have sunk a lot of costs (in the form of bid fees) then bid more aggressively, as if the object's value is increasing in the amount of sunk cost 16 .
There are interesting data on whether animals and children exhibit sunk cost fallacies.
An early study proposed that female digger wasps are sensitive to sunk costs, because when two females fight over a nest to which they have both brought dead katykids (for food), the one who brought more katydids wins more often 17 .
However, the number of katykids are both a sunk cost and have future marginal benefit, so the digger wasp example does not clearly imply a suboptimal tendency to look back at costs that are thoroughly sunk and have no association with marginal benefit, as in ideal experimental designs 18 . However, there is other evidence that animals act as if lever-pressing conditioned stimuli that require more effort to yield reward are more valuable, which is consistent with an effect of sunk cost on valuation 19 .
Finally, there is some intriguing evidence, albeit from tiny samples, that 5-6 year-olds do not exhibit a sunk cost effect in the "lost ticket" (snowstorm) paradigm described above 20, 21 . Eight-to-nine and 11-12 year-olds exhibit close to adult behavior, preferring to buy another ticket if they lost their ticket but not if they lost money.
Younger children typically do not make decisions about how to spend scarce resources (such as money, or taking time to cook food). The development of a "no waste"
heuristic, as a device to promote careful planning of resource spending, is therefore of little use to younger children. On this presumption, the unusual lack of a sunk cost effect among the 5-6 year olds is consistent with the general "no waste" explanation that drives adult behavior.
Supplementary Results
Additional analyses using the revised sunk cost effect measure
Because some participants showed preference reversals in some trials of the control condition, we also analyzed the data using the sunk cost measure taking this into account [revised sunk cost measure (revised SC): the rates of preference reversals under sunk cost condition -those under control condition]. Revised SC was significantly correlated with the agreeableness, conscientiousness, and averaged scores of these personality domains (r = 0.51, p = 0.003, r = 0.35, p = 0.046, and r = 0.53, p = 0.002, respectively, see Supplementary Table S6 ). Activation in the left insula also mediated the relationship of these personality traits (agreeableness, conscientiousness, and averaged scores of these personality domains) with the revised SC ( Supplementary Fig.   S2 ).
Additional analyses concerning activation associated with decision-making under sunk costs
In the current task, the ticket prices were systematically higher in the sunk cost condition compared with the control condition because the ticket price for the non-preferred destination was presented as 50% higher than the ticket price from the preferred one in the sunk cost condition. Therefore, we performed additional analyses reducing the confounding effect of the ticket prices. 
Sunk cost trials (A)
: sunk cost trials with costs of the preferred (chosen in the preference phase) options of ¥30,000, ¥40,000, ¥50,000, or ¥80,000 [costs of the non-preferred (not chosen in the preference phase) options were ¥45,000, ¥60,000, ¥75,000, or ¥120,000, respectively].
Sunk cost trials (B)
: sunk cost trials with costs of the preferred (chosen in the preference phase) options of ¥100,000 [costs of the non-preferred (not chosen in the preference phase) options were ¥150,000].
Control trials (C):
control trials with costs of the options of ¥40,000, ¥50,000, ¥80,000, or ¥100,000 (both options were identical in the control trials).
Control trials (D):
control trials with costs of the options of ¥30,000.
The mean costs of the non-preferred options and the sum of both (preferred and non-preferred) tickets in the "sunk cost trials (A)" were ¥70,000 and ¥116,667, respectively. The mean costs of the non-preferred options and the sum of both tickets in the "control trials (C)" were ¥75,000 and ¥150,000, respectively. Therefore, (1) the mean costs of the non-preferred options and (2) the mean costs of the sum of both tickets in the "sunk cost trials (A)" were nearly equal to those of the "control trials (C)"
[those in "the sunk cost trials (A)" were even slightly lower than those in the "control trials (C)"].
Then, we analyzed the data using the following GLM, which included The GLM also included motion parameters as regressors of no interest. We compared the brain activation during decision-making in the "sunk cost trials (A)" and the "control trials (C)". We also found that our identified regions during sunk cost decision-making (e.g., insula, IFG and ACC) were robustly activated [the statistical threshold was defined at a cluster-level q < 0.05 after correcting for multiple comparisons using FDR (at voxel-level uncorrected p < 0.001), Supplementary Table   7] . Image processing was performed using SPM8 (Wellcome Trust Center for Neuroimaging, London, UK) in MATLAB (MathWorks, Natick, MA, USA).
Functional images were corrected for differences in slice-acquisition timing and were then spatially realigned to correct for head motion. The realigned images were spatially normalized to fit the EPI template supplied in SPM8. The functional images were resampled into 2 mm × 2 mm × 2 mm voxels during the normalization process. Finally, all EPI images were smoothed using a Gaussian kernel with a full width at half maximum of 8 mm in the x, y, and z-axes.
